Are Institutions and Empiricism Enough? A Review of Allen Buchanan, \u3ci\u3eHuman Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force\u3c/i\u3e by Lister, Matthew J
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
4-1-2011 
Are Institutions and Empiricism Enough? A Review of Allen 
Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force 
Matthew J. Lister 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Repository Citation 
Lister, Matthew J., "Are Institutions and Empiricism Enough? A Review of Allen Buchanan, Human Rights, 
Legitimacy, and the Use of Force" (2011). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 360. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/360 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Are Institutions and Empiricism Enough? 
 
Review of Allen Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of 




Legal philosophers have given relatively little attention to international 
law in comparison to other topics, and philosophers working on 
international or global justice have not taken international law as a 
primary focus, either.2  Allen Buchanan’s recent work is arguably the 
most important exception to these trends.  For over a decade he has 
devoted significant time and philosophical skill to questions central to 
international law, and has tied these concerns to related issues of global 
justice more generally.  The book under review consists of thirteen 
papers and a brief introduction, divided into sections on human rights, 
legitimacy, and the use of force.  All of the papers were previously 
published between 1999 and 2008.  Although there is some overlap with 
Buchanan’s 2004 book on international law and justice,3 these papers 
largely complement and enrich the discussion from that volume, making 
their collection here a useful supplement to it and worthwhile in their 
own right.  There is some overlap in the papers themselves, but not so 
much as to give the feeling of déjà vu that one often has when reading a 
collection of essays.   
 Buchanan distinguishes his position from competing ones in two 
main ways.  First, he holds that theorizing about international law must 
be “empirically informed” if it is to be rigorous. (3)  Insofar as this 
means that we cannot rest with a priori theorizing, but must also look 
carefully at how law actually functions, I am in full agreement.  I shall 
show, however, that at several important points Buchanan does not 
follow his own advice as well as he might, and that this leads him to 
some doubtful conclusions.  Secondly, Buchanan stresses the important 
role of institutions in international law, and chides other for not giving 
them sufficient attention.  I will discuss Buchanan’s use of institutions 
below, and will raise questions about whether this approach can do all 
that he wants it to, but first must note that Buchanan’s focus on 
institutions is somewhat idiosyncratic.  
                                                 
1 Sharswood Fellow in Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
2 There are exceptions, of course.  Important examples include Fernando Teson, A 
Philosophy of International Law, Westview, 1998, and the important work by Larry 
May on international criminal law.   
3 Buchanan, Justice Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 While international relations scholars and political philosophers 
have been interested in institutions for some time, Buchanan’s focus and 
use differs from the main approaches in both fields.  “Institutionalism” in 
international relations holds that traditional “Realist” approaches are 
insufficient, in that they ignore and cannot explain the ways that states 
use institutions in the rational pursuit of their ends, and how institutions, 
once formed, may take on a life of their own and constrain state action.4  
However, traditional Institutionalism followed Realism in taking states 
to be unitary actors which follow the dictates of rational choice theory.  
This is not Buchanan’s view.  He (rightly, I think) holds that we must 
“look inside” states to see why they do what they do, and rejects a ration 
choice account of state action.  His account is distinctly normative, and 
many of the objections he raises against Realism would also apply to a 
traditional Institutionalist account.  While he argues that states have good 
reason to establish international institutions, the reasons he is interested 
in are moral, and not the dictates of rational choice theory applied to 
states as unitary actors, as suggested by the international relations 
Institutionalist approach. 
 Buchanan’s interests are also largely distinct from debates in the 
distributive justice literature between those, often inspired by Rawls, 
who take social institutions to be the primary “site” of distributive 
justice, and those, often following G A Cohen, who hold that institutions 
have no deep role to play in questions of distributive justice, and that the 
principles of distributive justice apply instead to our individual acts.5  
This difference arises not only because Buchanan is not primarily 
interested in distributive justice in this work, but more importantly 
because he is largely concerned with ways in which institutions can help 
our decision-making in international law.  They may do this by making 
decisions fairer or more representative.  But, Buchanan’s particular 
contribution is to focus our attention on the ways that institutions can 
improve our epistemic situations, by overcoming parochial or self-
interested perspectives, and improving information gathering, for 
example.  This is an important contribution and one that applies beyond 
international law.  I discuss my doubts about the results that Buchanan 
claims for this approach below.  I shall look at the three section of the 
book in turn, focusing primarily on one paper in each, discussing the 
others only briefly.  This is only for the sake of space, and not to slight 
the importance of the other papers. 
 Buchanan’s discussion of human rights begins with two papers 
devoted to criticizing Rawls’s views as set out in The Law of Peoples.  
                                                 
4 For a helpful overview of I.R. Institutionalism, including excerpts from foundational 
papers, see Oona A. Hathaway and Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of International 
Law and Politics, Foundations Press 2005, pp. 49-77. 
5 See, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. ed., Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999, 
p. 6-7.  For Cohen, see, e.g., GA Cohen,  If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re 
so Rich?, Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 134-79. 
Rather than spend time on my significant disagreement with the 
interpretation of Rawls found in these chapters, I will focus my attention 
on Buchanan’s positive contribution to the theory of human rights, a 
significantly more interesting topic.  In chapter 3, “Equality and Human 
Rights”, Buchanan sets out an account of human rights that he calls the 
“Modest Objectivist View” (“MOV”) and seeks to show both what 
conceptions of equality are required by it and how this conception fits 
with the larger philosophical literature on egalitarianism. (51)  Human 
rights, on this account, specify “interest that are constitutive of a decent 
human life”, where it is accepted that “there is a plurality of conditions 
that generally must obtain if an individual is to have the opportunity to 
live a decent human life.” (52)  This appeal to basic interests provides a 
justification for a list of human rights- they are not moral axioms that we 
somehow intuit- and so may provide a basis that is both less 
controversial and more determinate than the idea “human dignity”. (53)   
 This account leads to one sort of egalitarianism being inherent in 
human rights- a type of “descriptive equality”.  The interests human 
rights protect are ones we take to be common to all people.  Buchanan 
supplements this descriptive aspect with a “moral equality assumption”- 
the idea that each of us has the moral obligation to help insure that 
everyone has the chance to live a minimally decent life. (52)  Although 
this is an obligation that is held by and owed to individuals, the normal 
way most of us will discharge our obligations will be through various 
institutions.  While much of what Buchanan says in this section is 
interesting and plausible, controversy is likely to arise when there is 
disagreement over which interests are “constitutive of a decent human 
life”, and what institutions are necessary to insure these conditions.  
Buchanan’s discussion of whether there is a human right to democracy 
can serve as an example.   
 On Buchanan’s MOV, whether there is a human right to 
democracy depends on whether democracy, in some form, is “among the 
conditions that are generally necessary if the individual is to have an 
opportunity for a decent human life.” (59)  Intuitively, it seems clear that 
people may have the opportunity to live decent lives without democracy, 
so it would seem that there could be, on this account, no human right to 
it.  But Buchanan does not want to stop here.  He points to Sen’s work 
purporting to show that democracies do better at preventing certain bad 
outcomes, such as wide-spread famine.  But of course this work cannot 
be enough to establish that democracy is “generally necessary” for living 
a decent life, for two reasons.  First, even if it is true that some non-
democracies adopt disastrous policies, this would not show that 
becoming a democracy, in some modestly strong sense, would be the 
only way for states to avoid this problem.  Secondly, it would not show 
that democracy was sufficient for solving the problem, properly 
understood.  While India, for example, has not had massive famine 
leading to wide-spread death since independence, it has continually had 
large populations with serious enough food shortages to qualify as 
significant impairments of these people’s ability to live decent lives.  It is 
arguable that economic policies attempting to achieve internal self-
sufficiency helped lead to these problems.  In the mean time, China, 
clearly not a democracy, has raised huge numbers out of the sort of 
poverty that makes a decent life impossible.  So, it seems that democracy 
itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving some of the gains 
Buchanan hopes to secure. 
 Buchanan does not directly address this sort of worry, but might 
have it in mind, as he slips from the claim that for democracy to be a 
human right it must be “among the conditions that are generally 
necessary” for people to live a decent life (59) to the claim that 
democracy, on a certain understanding, “is the most reliable institutional 
arrangement” for providing the sort of protection needed. (60)  While 
democracy, on some understanding, may be the “most reliable” way to 
provide government accountability and other rights, several problems 
now arise.  To start, it is not clear how “most reliable” became the 
standard.  Why is it not enough to actually protect the relevant interests?  
Buchanan does not address this, leading to significant worries.  For one, 
which institutional arrangement is “most reliable” at protecting certain 
interests is often highly context-dependent, being strongly influenced by 
culture, history (including any recent history of ethnic violence), the 
level of education, access to information, economic development, and so 
on.  It is far from obvious that we can tell, even at a high level of 
abstraction, what is “the best” way to protect important interests in all 
cases.  This is, I claim, one of many examples where Buchanan’s call for 
more empirical grounding wears thin.  But if “the best” way depends on 
many context-specific factors, then it is highly unlikely that a demand for 
the universal implementation of a particular institutional arrangement is 
justified.  Furthermore, states that do manage to protect basic human 
interest without having democracy of the sort called for by Buchanan 
may rightly claim that his standard is unjustifiably parochial.  Why, if 
they actually do meet the standard, must they meet it in one particular 
way?  That the particular way suggested is “the best” or “most reliable” 
cannot be an acceptable answer without further argument. 
 Conversely, a requirement of “the best” or “most reliable” 
method of protecting rights might show too much.  We should have little 
confidence that the particular form of democracy found in any given 
country meets these high standards.  Buchanan notices this problem 
when he says that trying to specify which sort of democratic government 
is required would be parochial, (60) but how he is justified in moving 
beyond the bare requirement of protecting basic interests, however his is 
done, but not actually requiring “the best” or “most reliable” method, as 
he had earlier called for, is not clear.  Despite these worries, there is 
much of interest in Buchanan’s account.  In particular, his defense of 
human rights against certain charges of parochialism in chapter 4 is often 
convincing.  But, I hold that when we take his call for empirical rigor 
and consistency more seriously, we are left with a somewhat sparser list 
of human rights than Buchanan suggests. 
 The next four papers focus on the legitimacy of international law, 
including the compatibility of international law with democracy.  Two 
are co-written, and one provides a convincing demolition of parts of Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner’s book, The Limits of International Law.  I 
focus on one particular worry with the papers, especially with chapter 6, 
in this section.  Buchanan often talks about diverse areas of international 
law in a way that suggests that either all of these areas must be 
legitimated in the same way or perhaps must be legitimated all together.  
(The name of chapter 6, “The Legitimacy of International Law”, 
indicates the approach.)  While Buchanan notes a traditional tripartite 
division of international law- customary, treaty, and that arising from 
“global governance” institutions- he then approaches questions of 
legitimacy as if we should want or expect the same account for all of 
international law.  This is a mistake. 
 Even in domestic legal systems we can and should give different 
accounts of the legitimacy of constitutional law, criminal law, tort law, 
and so on.  In the international realm we have not only this problem, but 
also face the fact that there is no single “international legal system”.  
Even if it is no longer the case (if it ever was) that international law is 
not a system at all, but rather a mere collection of distinct rules,6 when 
we leave a priori theorizing behind for close empirical investigation, we 
see that international law is best thought of as being made of a number of 
largely distinct systems, some with important overlap, but without a 
unifying system behind them that might be legitimated once and for all.   
Once we notice this, two things emerge.  First, the challenges to 
international law that Buchanan notes can no longer be seen as 
challenges to international law as such, but only to particular parts of it.  
So even if a part is successfully challenged (or defended), this would 
leave the other parts untouched.  More importantly for Buchanan, (and as 
I have shown elsewhere7) this means that his attack on the idea that state 
consent plays a meaningful role in international law (143-6) must, at 
least, be re-cast in a more careful way, looking at the role played by 
consent in particular instances of international law.  Sometimes the 
conclusion to draw will be not that consent has no role to play, as 
Buchanan suggests (144), but rather that purported international law is 
not legitimate- a conclusion we might sometimes reach when strong 
states extort “consent” from weaker ones, for example.  But in other 
cases we may decided that consent is both necessary and sufficient for 
legitimacy, or that it has no meaningful role to play in a particular 
                                                 
6 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 236 for 
this claim 
7 Matthew Lister, “The Legitimating Role of Consent in International Law”, Chicago 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, Winter 2011, pp. 663-91. 
instance.  But this must be determined by looking closely at actual 
instances of international law, without the assumption that it makes up 
one unified system.  We again see the advantage of Buchanan’s advice to 
look closely, but see that he has not sufficiently followed it. 
The final section of the book consists of five papers on the use of 
force, including humanitarian intervention, just war theory and the 
acceptability of “preventive” war, and “illegal” actions aimed at 
improving international law.  These interesting and provocative chapters 
are likely to be among the most controversial in the book.  I will focus on 
the case for preventive war. 
Preventive war is war that seeks to avert a harm that is not 
imminent, and hence is a more permissive category than preemptive war, 
the sort approved by traditional just war theory. (280)  In chapters 11 
(“Institutionalizing the Just War”) and 12 (“Justifying Preventive War”), 
Buchanan seeks to show that traditional arguments against preventive 
war are not convincing, especially in the face of the “new conditions of 
terrorism”. (258-63) Buchanan’s argument that preventive war is at least 
sometimes acceptable has two aspects.  First, he argues that both 
consequentialist and “rights based” arguments against preventive war are 
less convincing than many have thought.  Secondly, he argues that by 
institutionalizing a preventive war norm we can reduce the dangers 
inherent in it to acceptable levels.  I will raise doubts about both aspects. 
One major problem with an argument for preventive, as opposed 
to preemptive, war is that, as the danger to be prevented is not yet 
imminent, there may be significant doubt that it will ever come to 
fruition at all.  War is an extreme response, and we have good reason, 
both consequentialist and “rights based”, to want to limit it as much as 
possible.  Buchanan argues that “institutionalizing” the preventive war 
norm solves the epistemological difficulties.  For reasons I will discuss 
below, I am significantly less optimistic about this than Buchanan is.  
However, in the articles in question, Buchanan largely assumes that this 
is possible, and then asks how traditional objections to preventive war 
hold up, taking the epistemic difficulties as solved.  Those skeptical of 
preventive war should resist this move. 
Much like debates over torture, where one side wishes to 
postulate that we know the person to be torture is a terrorist who knows 
where a ticking bomb is about to explode, and that there is no way to 
stop it without torture, there is good reason here to not engage with such 
debates, at least not without a clear and convincing account of how we 
would have such knowledge, and have it with a high degree of certainty.  
I will return to this last point momentarily, but here must stress why this 
extremely high degree of certainty is needed.  Buchanan goes to great 
length to show that many military members who would be killed in a 
preventive war are legitimate targets, especially if they are given the 
chance to surrender before an attack. (290-6)   I did not find these 
arguments fully persuasive, but was much more taken aback by the fact 
that civilian casualties were not considered with any care at all.  Yet 
civilian casualties are all but inevitable in even “pinpoint” attacks.  We 
can, I think, be much more certain of this than we are ever likely to be 
that a case of preventive war is truly necessary.  It is deeply implausible, 
in almost every case, that civilians are themselves culpable enough to 
justify targeting them.  And, even knowingly putting them at risk, given 
that they are innocents, requires significant justification, and a very high 
degree of certainty that a preventive attack is the only way to avoid a 
grave harm.  The mere possibility of such certainty, while perhaps of 
some purely philosophical interest, is not enough to justify moving away 
from the old standards.  The burden of proof must be on those who 
would move away from the old standard- against torture or limiting 
ourselves to preemptive war- to show that we have the right sort of 
certainty.   
Here Buchanan relies on his claim that institutions can solve this 
problem.  I am much less confident.  Again as in the torture case, 
preventive war cases are ones where we can expect that the incentives 
will be such as to encourage states to get the answer wrong.  Buchanan 
suggests that having multiple parties consider the issue would help (286), 
but I am here most reminded of the warning from a “demotivational” 
poster about meetings: sometimes, none of us is as dumb as all of us.  
Group reasoning does not necessarily lead to better outcomes.  Buchanan 
insists that this must be done in ways so as to require full information 
sharing and an explicit discussion of intelligence, but offers no reason to 
think this is plausible, and we can well expect that a state considering 
war would be less inclined to share all it knew.  Buchanan further 
suggests that states with recent records of serious human rights violations 
should be excluded from the process, but if taken seriously this would 
exclude nearly all the states which might make use of such an institution, 
including the U.S.  In short, Buchanan has given us no reason to think an 
institution that could achieve the needed level of certainty is plausible or 
even possible, short of the invention of crystal balls.  It is perhaps unfair 
to expect a philosopher to do more.  But, without this work, the argument 
for preventive war is at best worthless, and potentially much worse, in 
that, like the ticking bomb scenario, it may serve to give comfort and 
encouragement to those would use the argument without the needed 
certainty.  Here we see the limits of an appeal to institutions, an appeal 
that re-appears over and over in the book.  Unless and until we have 
some idea of how such institutions would work and are given reasons to 
think they are plausible, such appeals are mere hand-waiving.  This is an 
attractive option in political philosophy- one I have engaged in myself on 
occasion- but we should not mistake it for the serious work needed, 
especially when the stakes are as high as they are in the sorts of cases 
discussed in this book. 
